First CEO TK Kurien opened by describing Wipro’s view of the market:

• Enterprises were created prior to the current digital era. As a result, customers cannot engage easily or effectively with legacy enterprises operating with old style operating models and operations systems
• Operations vendors (IT services and BPO) will be disrupted. “Slow and certain”, Wipro’s previous model, where offerings were developed and tested to assure quality outcomes, is no longer a successful strategy. Wipro describes its current model as “Fast and Uncertain”, where ideas are tried, then adapted over time, as a flexible strategy more appropriate for rapidly changing times
• The journey with clients to a digital operational development cannot be undertaken at full maturity. It requires Wipro, partners, and clients to slowly adapt while also continuing to provide current services. To accomplish that Wipro needs to maintain and aggressively grow existing operational relationships. Wipro will aggressively pursue new business to establish larger market share, because existing clients provide a base from which transformation can be launched (i.e., upsell). Kurien did not discuss how he intends to pursue new business before transformation. Presumably aggressive pricing and terms would underpin such a grab for marketshare
• Traditional BPO will be disrupted, with value levers extending beyond labor arbitrage and simple process re-engineering. While this has been a theme for several years in the industry, Kurien indicated community sourcing (open source software, cloud computing, and shared services) as opposed to vendor specific offerings will drive enterprise operations much more so in the years ahead than has been the case to date.

To address these trends, Wipro is changing its own approach. Key initiatives include:

• Digital POD, Wipro’s methodology for clients designing new operations environments (both platforms and processes).The process draws on strategy, design, and technology. Wipro is building technology and design capabilities in concert with partners to support clients’ evolving business strategies. Specifically Wipro is currently building three digital POD centers in London, Bangalore, and the Bay area of California. These centers will work on client engagements designing new operations environments for clients. As examples of how this might work, Wipro referred to several tier one banking clients, hit hard by the financial crisis and culling businesses and operations, who are redefining their business models to adapt to changing regulations and competitive conditions. Automating manual processes, modernizing legacy platforms, and maintaining ongoing delivery requires third party help from a combined IT/BPO vendor. An early example of what Wipro wants to do, according to Kurien, is a top 4 bank in the U.K. that Wipro has helped over the past three years improve its retail customer support using platform and operations change and support. During that time the client moved up from fourth to first in customer satisfaction ratings.
• Alliances and partnerships:
  • Open source: Wipro has committed to invest over the next two years to further develop its open source capabilities. Open source development has become a key area of investment for banks and other global 100 companies. Open source is used by enterprises for its low cost and ability to deliver custom functionality.
  • Wipro is building on its existing experience and joining open source communities to better identify best resources, also to help formulate community priorities
  • Corporate VC fund to invest in tech start-ups. Wipro has made three investments so far
• Move its own business model from labor arbitrage to process arbitrage (global standardization and greater automation of processing). Wipro has seen their clients’ focus for operational change shift from cost of resource to total cost of ownership (TCO), over the past few years and believes this trend will continue and accelerate.

Wipro articulated that, as a company, it is responding to the fact that businesses in its target sectors (banking, healthcare and retail, to name just three) are having to change their entire operational delivery methodology to adapt to the changing environment. Wipro also highlighted that this requires to talent - both technology and operations talent.

And, like many other IT services providers, Wipro is looking with increased interest at alliances and partnerships. Partnering however requires a wide net to succeed. Most partnerships are weak, some are strong, and a few drive strong value creation.

The challenge with partnering is how to drive partners forward to execution when they have competing demands/opportunities. Successful partnerships require the alignment of goals and culture, which in turn requires due diligence on potential partners and clear signalling of intentions and values.

Participation in communities, such as open source, is table stakes to access and due diligence, but not the trigger to execution. Wipro has indicated it will support partners by identifying sub-domains where it will be active. Wipro has a large client base, something developers typically do not. Wipro can create a market for open source developers’ services, while providing its clients with quality assurance and scale.  IT and operational support. In the long run, we believe Wipro will need to selectively partner with relatively few organizations and people for open source capabilities. Ultimately, Wipro will need large scale in-house complementary resources to capitalize on engagements. Leveraging the independent resources of alliance partners to deliver operational change to clients will demand that Wipro bring its own operational scale to the table, not merely IT skills. 

Visa formed an alliance with Monitise in 2009 to provide Visa with mobile platform development services. The agreement runs through 2016. As part of the agreement, Visa made a capital investment in Monitise and received 14.4% of the company's equity. Over time, Visa has reduced its ownership to 5.5%. Visa has now contracted with J.P. Morgan to evaluate its options for its ownership stake in Monitise.

According to Visa, the reduction in ownership is consistent with Visa’s investment practice to seed emerging players and, over time, reduce such investments. Visa has also announced it intends to continue increasing its investment in its own in-house mobile payments development capabilities and reduce its use of external resources for those purposes.

Visa’s announcement caps off a weak year for Monitise in the stock market (down 59% for 2014 as of September 18). Does the market know something or is this a natural development in the growth of Monetise, as Visa has indicated?

First let’s consider Monitise’s business results to date:

Among the positives:

• Revenue growth of 105% CAAGR over the past five years to the FY year end June 2014
• Transaction volumes has grown 3,300% over the past four years to 4,000m per year to year end June 2014
• The number of registered users has grown 3,000% over the past five years ended June 2014
• Numerous partnerships and markets entered over the past five years around the world. The majority of these partnerships are with tier one players in their respective markets, providing uplift to Monitise in its quest for adoption

Among the challenges:

• Monitise is still loss-making
• It recently changed its business model from a mobile payments platform provider model to a subscription based “content” enhanced mobile payments provider. Here content means the ability to provide sales and marketing content to users and to analyze transaction data in support of sales and marketing campaigns
• Mobile payments remains a demonstration project at most banks and businesses. It has not yet turned into a driver of revenues or profits (for tier one global enterprises)

Where Monitise is going and why Visa is reducing its relationship:

Monitise is moving into more intimate relationships with merchants and enterprise clients by providing them with content enhanced services. Monitise has made this initiative very credible by:

• Starting a partnership with IBM in August 2014, which leverages IBM’s IT development and services staff also its cloud delivery infrastructure. This partnership means Monitise can scale delivery as much as the market might require
• Hiring senior staff from Visa to manage and grow Monitise’s business in the U.S. and Europe
• Partnering with Mastercard (including an equity investment from Mastercard) to drive emerging market growth

These moves create a direct conflict with Visa because Visa wants to deliver content to its clients and Visa is a direct competitor to Mastercard. To succeed, Monitise needs to continue its aggressive acquisition of users and transactions. If Monitise can establish content leadership in the emerging markets, it will have created a unique and highly valuable asset.

To create that content leadership, Monitise needs to do more than acquire users and transactions, it needs to understand the mind of the emerging market consumer. There is no one emerging market consumer profile. Each market has unique characteristics, economics, and tastes. Creating content that can adapt to multiple markets requires extreme discipline at the taxonomy creation stage, and extreme autonomy at the individual country level. Monitise will need to partner both aggressively and effectively to accomplish that. 

Alliance Data's Epsilon division has ~$1,5bn in revenues; Conversant has ~$600m. 

Alliance Data is acquiring Conversant to enhance its Epsilon business. Epsilon generates revenues primarily from labor based, offline: data acquisition, analysis, and marketing services. Conversant generates revenues primarily from automated processing, on line: data acquisition, analysis, and marketing services. Alliance Data believes that Conversant is in a faster growing segment of its market, with solutions that provide higher operating leverage. 

Each company brings technology capabilities which will be integrated after the merger. These capabilities include:

• Conversant:
  • In-house data set combined with client acquired data 
  • CommonID, which identifies an individual consumer across multiple devices (e.g., desktop, mobile, tablet) and channel
  • Ability to dynamically send personal ads to the correct device ant the correct time
• Alliance Data: Agility Harmony, a digital messaging platform with the artificial learning and analytics to inform a digital marketing campaign, combined with the ability to manage and execute a digital marketing campaign.

The acquisition will provide more purchase data (from additional channels including: display, mobile, and video) to put through Epsilon's marketing analytics platform, Agility Harmony. The increase in data throughput will develop greater insights by Epsilon into consumer behavior. Conversant also brings a greater number of clients to Epsilon, to whom Epsilon hopes to sell additional services. 

Conversant is an excellent acquisition for Alliance Data. The ability to engage consumers across multiple channels and devices, while also maintaining identity awareness, is not generally available today. Most of today's on-line marketing organizations are facing consumer push back and brand deterioration the more they continue to make identity errors and push the wrong offerings, to the wrong people, at the wrong time.

Alliance Data is also aware of its limitations. It intends, according to its CEO Ed Heffernan, to continue to pursue opportunities in niche markets rather than take on major payments vendors in major markets. Its specialty areas include:

• Geographic: Canada and Brazil
• Industry: travel, SMBs, and specialty retail

Successful integration of these two offering sets will create a unique database of transaction level data in some of the fastest growing, high margin markets in consumer buying. As long as Alliance Data can successfully integrate the two cultures, the businesses should succeed. It is a good sign of what the Conversant management thinks about the merger that the CEO of Convergent will tender his shares for all Alliance Data stock (not taking the cash option). 

Q2 2014 revenues (and revenue change) by activity, excluding reimbursables, were:

• North America: $233.2m (+8.7%)
• International: $84.7m (+10.6%)
• Merchant services: $108.3m (-4.1%)
• Netspend: $116.8m (n.m., acquired Q2 2013)
• Intersegment: ($5.1m) (-59.1%).

TSYS grew its revenues slower than it grew its transaction volumes in:

• North America (transactions +20.7%)
• International (transactions +13.3%)
• Merchant services (transactions -8.0%, a slower shrink)

TSYS is facing pricing difficulties in its core businesses and volume/revenue shrink in what should be its primary growth engine. Its overall revenues have primarily grown due to its acquisition of Netspend.

TSYS has announced a new CEO (starting on July 31, 2014) who will face the task of putting its organic business back on track for revenue growth at profitable margins. Since the payments market is strong overall, if TSYS focuses on aggressive contract pursuits at good prices, it should be able to resume revenue growth with good margins. 

In 2013 TSYS continued to enjoy strong revenue and earnings growth. Growth in the merchant business is continuing to accelerate, based partly on:

• Competitor weakness (others such as First Data will report in early February and will indicate whether that trend will continue) 
• Merchant dissatisfaction with card schemes and the desire to obtain a processor with fewer if any issuer loyalties.

The international business grew at 5.8% in fiscal Q4, the strongest of any segment. This growth occurred in spite of headwinds from currency exchange rates due to a strengthening dollar. If the dollar moderates, TSYS will have very strong double digit growth in its international business, where its long-term growth opportunities lie. 

The next few years should see international growth for TSYS accelerate to even higher levels (20% and 30% growth rates). The payments business, in particular merchant acceptance, is certainly not subject to the rules of the "new normal". The question is whether high growth rates and low capital charges from regulators will draw in new competitors to the payments business - but the complexity of the business would make it very difficult for most would-be entrants.  

Business rationalization and expansion will be a tougher nut to crack. Organic growth cannot deliver the overall growth required to grow revenues and margin at acceptable rates. Xerox will need to acquire, but any large acquisition program will incur failed acquisitions. Xerox intends to keep the damage down by acquiring businesses at low prices, which is likely to cause it to miss big wins, but avoid big losses.

Finally, culling businesses (such as the student loan processing business, which is shrinking fast and reducing margins because overhead has not shrunk as fast as revenue) will be necessary for Xerox services to focus on its winning businesses. It is not clear anyone would want to buy the student loan processing business, making a cull impossible, and downsizing the only option. Xerox will need to focus on segments of its financial services BPO business that can be grown rapidly to offset the shrink in the student loan part of the financial services business. Other sunset businesses will have to be handled the same way if there are no bidders.

Xerox will succeed at bring its services operational performance up to its operational expectations, but it will take 3 years to accomplish.